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SITUATIOX III

INLAl"\TD STATE AT WAR
States X and Y are at 'var. All states other than
Btate D declare neutrality. State Y has no seacoast.
T'he Black River is the common boundary of X and Y
for 100 miles. Y has private merchant vessels and aircraft under its flag. All vesseLs and aircraft of Y are
rf'gistered at Yara, the capital of Y. Some of the merchant vessels of Y have had their decks strengthened so
that they may take on 6- inch guns. Some of these
vessels have already installed these gull$. X has vessels
and aircraft of the same character under its flag.
(a) State A under its proclamation of neutrality excludes from its waters both types of vessels of X and Y,
and all vessels of 'var and ve.ssels assimilated thereto.
(b) State B refuses to admit vessels of X and Y with
prize.
(c) State C, adjoining state Y, refuses to permit an
aircraft of Y to fly over its territory to a vessel of Y
which is at sea.
(d) State D, a maritime state, refuse.s to grant to
either X or Y any rights 'vhich might flow from a declaration of war or to accept any neutral obligations so far
as aerial or maritime acts are concerned, on the ground
that the 'var must be confined to the land territory of
X andY.
vVhat are the lawful rights of the parties(1) If the Black River is navigable to Yara?
(2) If the Black River is not navigable to any point
in state Y?
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SOLUTION

(a) State A 1nay lawfully in its proclamation of
neutrality exclude all vessels of war and ve.ssels assimilated thereto. This 'vould apply to armed merchant
vessels, but ordinarily not to unarmed merchant vessels
"~hether or not decks had been strengthened.
(b) State B may lawfully refuse to admit vessels of
".,.ar of X and Y 'vith prize except on account of unseaworthiness, stress of "~eather, or lack of fuel or supplies.
(c) State C may lawfully refuse to permit aircraft or
Y to fly over its territory to a vessel of Y '~hich is at sea.
(d) State D 1nay not la,vfully refuse to grant to X
and Y rights 'vhich might flow from a declaration o£
war or refuse to accept any neutral obligations so far
as aerial or maritime acts are concerned though the
geographical location of state D might make special
regulations justifiable.
NOTES

Status in ti11ze of conflict.-The recognition of belligerent and of neutral status has been of slo'v growth. The
recognition of belligerent status and the gradual determination of the rights appertaining to this status can be
traced before the sixteenth century but fron1 that time
the recognition is clear and the determination of rights
is n1arked. Gentilis (1588) defined "~ar as "a properly
conducted contest of ar1ned public forces." (De jure belli,
bk. I, ch. 2.) Since that time further atte1npts have been
made to set bouncls to the status of belligerency, such as
regards the beginning of '~ar in the Hague Convention
III, 1907, providing that hostili6es between the contracting parties should " not co1nmence without previous and
explicit '~arning "and in Convention II providing against
the en1ployment of force for the recovery of contract
debts claimed from one govern1nent by another governInent as due to its nationals unless the debtor state fails
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to respond to arbitral methods. These limitations upon
time and cause of war have in practice seemed to n1eet
general approval. Other attempts to limit the actual conduct of 'var have also been elaborated and even in the
strain of the ti1ne of belligerency the conventions relating
to the rules and customs of war on land and sea have
in large 1neasure been respected and departures from these
rules have been 'videly condemned.
The laws of neutrality have been developing and many
of these were embodied in the Hague conventions of 1899
and 1907 and in the unratified Declaration of London
of 1909. The Declaration of Paris of 1856 has received
npproval of most of the states of the world.
The rules of 'var and of . neutrality, written and unwritten, have been the subject of many court decisions
'vhich serve to define the limits of lawful action.
Diplomatic and other negotiations have also clarified
the understanding and application of these rules.
The rules and customs of war on land and sea at any
particular period have not been found clearly applicable
to every problem to which war might give rise, but considering difference in character and interests of the parties at war, the effect has been generally approved as aiding in progress to,vard removing of grounds of international friction. Sudden and marked attempts to change
established rules have unsettled conditions and multiplied the possibilities of friction and misunderstandings.
International laws of war and of neutrality have tended
to regard custom and precedent while recognizing the
:force of changing conditions.
It is true that at times a state has conceived that its
interests might be better served by a course of action not
in accord with internationallaw, but such a condition has
not been regarded in practice or in the courts as sufficient
ground for setting aside accepted law or for proclaiming
a purpose of following a policy at wide variance with
international law· though exceptional conditions have
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been £ron1 time to tiine adn1itted as a1neliorating obligations.
lVar and neutrality.-,Vhen t'vo or 1nore states are at
"~ar, other nonparticipating states are generally neutral.
It is custon1ary for states to issue declarations o£ neutrality, often outlining the course o£ conduct they propose to
folio''· I£ the neutral states are strong, the course o£ conduct prescribed in the procla1nations w·ill probably be
follo"·ed. I£ the neutral stat€s are ''eak or ti1nid or both,
the belligerents "·ill tend to oYerride the prescriptions
''heneYer it can be adYantageously clone.
,,. . hile it is prestnnecl that states which take no part in
the "·ar are neutral, it is not necessarily true that uncertainty 1nay not arise in case a declaration does not exist,
is "·ithdraw·n, or n1odified.
There are rules "~hich are acceptell as generally binding, yet fron1 the nature of conditions in different areas
special regulations 1nay be reasonable and neutrality regulations haYe Yaried greatly.
The content of the idea o£ neutrality is not fixed and
no concept of neutrality has existed sufficiently long to
1nake its continuance assured. Grotius in his great treatise, D e Jure Belli ac Pacis, in 1625 gaYe little attention to
the subject, but Bynkershoek early in the next century
gaye a good definition of neutrality, a status 'vhich was
then in fact unco1nn1on in interstate relations. ...t\.t the
end of the eighteenth century the idea o£ neutrality ''as
soine,Yhat further defined by the practice of the United
States follo,ving the proclan1ation o£
ashington o£ Deceinber 3, 1793, in ''hich. ''hile not 1nentioning "neutrality", he asserts that the United States " should 'vith
sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct
friendly and in1partial toward the belligerent po,Yers."
N entrality ltn\s "·ere subsequently enacted by many
states. The fundamental idea "·as as Bynkershoek said
to be "'of neither party."
It has been pointed out that in so1ne conditions an
attitude of impartiality might be as vahJable as an alli-
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ance. T'his n1ight be the case 'vhen one of the belligerents lacked entirely an article essential to the conduct of
'var 'vhich a nearby neutral could furnish in unlimited
quantity 'vithout risk of interference from the other
belligerent. Such situations have given rise to discussions in regard to the obligations of neutraLs to accommodate their conduct to the geographic relationship of
the belligerents, so that. one might not be benefited more
than the other.
Protests have been 1nade by one belligerent to the
effect that the nationals of a neutral should not sell to
another belligerent goods 'vhich were of a nature to
aiel in carrying on the 'var, particularly if the protesting
belligerent was not in position to take advantage o.f such
trade. Such protests have not been regarded a~ valid
ns is evident in the correspondence during war.
A circular of the Department of State of the United
States early in the, World War, October 15, 1914, states:
"In the first place it should be understood that, generally speaking, a citizen of the United States ean sell to a belligerent goYernment or its agent any article of commerce which be pleases.
He is not prohibited from doing this by any rule of international
law, b~· any treaty provisions, or by any statute of the United
States. It makes no difference whether the articles sold are exclusively for war purposes, such as firearms, explosives, etc., or
are foodstuffs, clothing, horses, etc., for the use of the army or
navy of the belligerent.
"Furthermore, a neutral govern1nent is not compelled by international law, by treaty, or by statute to prevent these sales
to a belligerent. Such sales, therefore, by American citizens do
not in the least affect the neutrality of the United States.
"It is true that such articles as those mentioned are considered
contraband and are, outside the territorial jurisdiction of a neutral nation, subject to seizure by an enemy of the purchasing
government, but it is the enemy's duty to prevent the articles
n'aching their destination, not the duty of the nation whose citizens have sold them. If the enemy of the purchasing nation hapl1ens for the time to be unable to do this that is for him one of
the 1nisfortunes of war; the inability, however, hnposes on the
r.eutral govern1nent no obligation to preYent the sale." (1916
Naval 'Yar College, International Law Topics, p. 95.)
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Status of Brazil, 1917.-Brazil by Decree of 1\ugust 4,
1914, declared its neutrality, broke diplomatic relations
·with Gennany, April 11, 1917, revoked its neutrality,
June 4, 1917, and declared war against Germany, October 26, 1917. There 'vas uncertainty as to the status of
Brazil during the period from June 4, 1917, when Brazil
revoked its neutrality and October 26, 1917, when Brazil
declared war. 'Ihe note on revocation of neutrality of
June 4, 1917, as addressed by the Brazilian .A.mbassac1or
to the Secretary of State of the United States was as
follows:
"WASHINGTON,

June .1, 1917.

"l\In. SECRETARY OF STATE: The President of the Republic has
just instructed me to inform your excellency's GoYernment that
he has approYed the law which revokes Brazil's neutrality in the
war between the United States of America and the German Empire. The Republic has thus recognized the fact that one of the
Lelligerents is a constituent portion of th~ American Continent
and that we are bound to that belligerent by traditional friendship and the same sentiment in the defense of the vital interests
of .America and the accepted principles of law.
"Brazil ever \vas, and is now, free from warlike ambitions, and
while it always refrained from showing any partiality in the
European conflict, it could no longer stand unconcerned when
the struggle involved the United States actuated by no interest
whatever but solely for the sake of international judicial order
and when Germany included us and the other neutral powers in
the most violent acts of war.
"'Vhile the comparative lack of reciprocity on the part of the
.A.merican republics has hitherto divested the ~Ionroe Doctrine of
its true character, permitting an interpretation based on the prerogatiYes of their sovereignty, the present events, now bringing
Brazil to the side of the United States at a critical moment in
the history of the world, continue to impart to our foreign policy
u practical form of continental solidarity; a policy, howeYer,
\Yhich was also tha.t of the former regime whenever one of the
other sister friendly nations of the American Continent was concE·rned. ·The Republic has strictly obserYed our political and
diploma tic traditions and remained true to the liberal principles
in which the nation was nutured.
"Thus understanding our duty, and taking the position indicated by Brazil's antecedents and the conscience of a free people,
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"hateYer developments the morrow may have in store for us,
we shall conserve the constitution which governs us and which
has not yet been surpassed in the guaranties due to the rights,
lives, and property of foreigners.
"In bringing the above stated resolution to your excellency's
knowledge I beg you to be pleased to convey to your Government
the sentiments of unalterable friendship of the Brazilian people
and Government.
DOMICIO DA GAMA."

(Forc:gn Relations, 1917, Supplement I, p. 294.)

In acknowI edging this communication £rom Brazil the
ncting Secretary o£ State o£ the United States said:
"\VASHINGTON, June 16, 1917.
"Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of
y(;nr note of June 4, by whieh, ·in vursuance of instructions from
the President of Brazil, you inform me of the enactment of a
l:Jw revoking Brazil's declaration of neutrality in the war between
the United States ancl Germany, and request me to convey to this
Government the sentilnents of unalterable friendship of the
Brazilian people and Government.
"I have received with profound gratification this notification
of the friendly cooperation of Brazil in the efforts of the United
States to assist in the perpetuation of tlle prindples of free government and tl1e preservation of the agencies for the amelioration of the sufferings and losses of war, so slowly and toilfully
built up during the emergence of mankind from barbarism.
"Your Government's invaluable contribution to the cause of
American solidarity, now rendered more important than ever as
a protection to civilization and a means of enforcing the laws of
hu1nanity, is highly appreciated by the United States.
'' I shall be glad if you will be good enough to convey to the
President, the Government, and the people of Brazil, the thanks
of th is Government and people for their course, so consistent
with the antecedents of your great and free nation and so important in its bearing on issues which are vital to the welfare of
all the An1erican republics.
"Requesting that you will also assure your Government and
people of most cordial reciprocation by the Government and people
of the United States of their assurances of friendship, always so
greatly valued, and now happily rendered still warmer and closer
by the action of Brazil, I avail my self [etc.].
(Ibid., p. 300.)
FRANK L. POLl{.''
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Other South and Central 1-\1nerican States took action
of a si1nilar nature supporting A1nerican solidarity.
Son1e of these states 'vere unable to engage in aggressive
hostilitie,s tow·ard Germany but did not 1naintain neutrality, and by pern1itting use of ports to the 1\.llies and
by other conduct 1nanifested an attitude of passiYe
hostility to,vard the Central Powers.
Apparentl~r eYen in Brazil the breaking of eli plo1natic
1·elations and the expression to,varcl the United States
of "the senti1nents of unalterable friendship of the Brazilian people and GoYerninent" did not inYoh·e definite
participation in the ""ar for it "·as not till 1nore than 4
1nonths later that Brazil declared 'Yar against Gern1any.
The Depart1nent of State of the 1Jnited States announced
on October 26, 1917, that it had been infor1ned that the
Brazilian Senate at 6: 20 o'clock, Friday afternoon, October 26, 1917, had voted the declaration of 'var against
Gern1any 'vhich had been approYed by the Chamber at
3 o'clock.
"A state of war hetween Brazil and the Gennan Empire, provoked by the latter, is hereby recognized and proclaimed, and the
President of the Republic, in accordance with the request contained in his message to the National Congress, is hereby authorized to take such steps for the national defense and public safety
as he shall consider adequate, to open the necessary credits and
to authorize the credit operations required. All previous measures
to the contrary are hereby revoked." (Ibid., p. 65.)

There 'vas thus a period under neutrality regulations,
August 4, 1914, to June 4, 1917, during a part of "·hich,
April11 to June 11, 1917, diplomatic relations with GerInany 'vere severed. This period 'vas follo,ved by a
period during 'vhich diplomatic relations were still severed and neutrality revoked and a recognition of the
American "continental solidarity" 'vas announced and a
spirit of friendship for the United States 'vas expressed
but 'vithout declaration of 'var till October 26, 1917.
Costa Rica in World War, 1914-18.-In spite of therefusal of the United States to recognize the revolutionary
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government o:f Tinoco in Costa Rica in 1917, Tinoco's
Secretary o:f State :for Foreign Affairs informed the
An1erican lVIinjster to Costa Rica o:f the attitude o:f the
government o:f Tinoco, April 3, 1917:
"Go\·ernment of Tinoco expresses desire to make known that
without taking into aceount recognition on behalf of the Government of the United States in any emergencies which arise between Germany and the Unite(J States lJy reason of the relations
ill which these two countries fill(l themsel\·es t o-day, Government
of Costa Rica not only is disposed to observe towards the United
States a benevolent neutrality but also to prevent development
upon its territory of any hostility again~t them." (Foreign Relatiolls, U. S., 1917, SUJ1pleinent 1. p. 243.)

Like Brazil, Costa Rica expressed in a note o:f April 9,
1917, the idea o:f A1nerican "solidarity" and also offered
the use o:f its ports and "·aters to the navy o:f the United
States. Costa Rica. did not, ho"·ever, break diplomatic
relations 'vith Germany till Septe1nber 1, 1917, and declared 'var on ~1ay 24, 1918.
State witlzout seacoast.-There has been some argu1nent
that "·hen a state 'vithout a seacoast is at 'var 'vith a
state having a seacoast, other maritime and neutral states
should in their neutrality proclamations embody such restrictions as would equalize the conditions o:f the belligerent states as respects com1nerce. Such a practice might
i1nply that the neutral mariti1ne states should prohibit
comn1erce in articles of contraband and destined to the
belligerent maritime state "·hile territorially adjacent
states might carry on comn1erce "·ith both belligerents.
The doctrine o:f continuous yoyage has beco1ne too 'Yell
established to easily adapt itself to such conditions. I:f
the landlocked state is to be per1nitted to have its flag
upon the sea and upon aircraft above the sea, it might
create a privileged position :for the state " ·ithont a seacoast and this geography does not do.
lVorld lVar treaties on fiags.-The Treaty o:f \Ter~· ailles, June 28, 1919, made provision :for the recognition
of flags flo,yn by vessels o:f .states having no seacoast.
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Article 273 stated:
" In the case of vessels of the Allied or Associated Powers, all
classes of certificates or documents relating to the vessel, which
were recognized as valid by Germany before the war, or which
may hereafter be recognized as valid by the principal maritilne
States, shall be recognized by Germany as valid and as equivalent
to the corresponding certificates issued to German vessels.
"A similar recognition shall be accorded to the certificates and
docun1ents issued ~o their vessels by the Governments of new
States, whether they have a sea-coast or not, provided that such
certificates and documents shall be issued in conformity with the
general practice observed in the principal maritime States.
"The High Contracting Parties agree to recognise the flag
flown by the vessels of an Allied or Associated Power having no
sea-coast which are registered at some one specified place situated
in its territory ; such place shall serve as the port of registry of
£Uch vessels." (1919 Naval \Var College, International Law
Documents, p. 120.)

By article 153 o£ the Treaty o£ Neuilly, November 27,
1919, Bulgaria agrees to the same provisions a.s to the
flag as those in the Treaty o£ Versailles. Article 225 o£
the Treaty o£ Saint-Germaine-en-Laye, September 10,
1919, contained the same provision relating to Austria
except that the words " any contracting party " 'vere
substituted ~for the words " an Allied or Associated
}"lower." This article was identical 'vith article 209 o£
the Treaty o£ Trianon, June 4, 1920, with Hungary.
In article 102 o£ the Treaty o£ Lausanne, July 24, 1923,
Turkey undertakes to adhere to the Barcelona Convention o£ April 20, 1921.
Barcelona Convention, 1921.-The regulation o:f transit
on land and sea was at the close o:f the World vVar regarded as a matter o:f.capital world importance. A conterence :for the purpose o£ reaching agreement on this
subject 'vas held at Barcelona early in 1921, and on April
20 reached the :following agreement as to the use o:f the
national flag upon vessels belonging to states which have
no seacoast :
" The undersigned, duly authorised for the purpose, declare
that the States which they represent recognise the flag flown by
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the vessels of any State haYing no seacoast which are registered
at some one specifiec1 place situated in its territory; such place
shall serve as the port of registry of suc·h yessels.
" Barcelona, .April the 20th, 1921, done in a single copy of which
the English and French texts shall be authentic." (7 LNTS, p. 73;
192-1 NaYal '\Var College, International Law Documents, p. 83.)

Article XIV, lVaslzington Treaty, 192~.-Article XIV
of the ~;Vashington Treaty of 1922 on the Limitation of
Naval Arn1ament provided that:
"No preparations shall be made in merchant ships in time of
peace for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose
of converting such ships into yessels of war, other than the necessary stiffening of decks for the mounting of guns not exceeding 6inch (152 millimetres) calibre." (1921 Naval War College, International Law Documents, p. 299.)

This article did not receive much attention in the way
of discussion in the ~Vashington Conference. It constitutes a limitation upon construction in the ti1ne of peace.
of vessels 'vhich might be converted in time of war. Such
vessels 1night be treated by the opposing belligerent as
potential auxiliary vessels, but there would not necessarily
be any evidence apparent to a neutral ''hich '\vould be
convincing as to the nature of the vessel.
Under article XI'T a belligerent finding a 111erchant vessel of an enemy, the decks of ·which are stiffened for the·
1nounting of guns, would be co1npetent to decide upon the·
treatment of such a vessel as a potential vessel of war.
In the Second Hague Conference, 1907, the convention
relating to the status o:f enemy merchant ships at the outbreak o:f hostilities stated in article 5 that the article
J·elating to days of grace for enemy 1nerchant ships" does
not affect merchant ships whose build shows that they·
are intended for conversion into warships." This article·
seems to be entirely reasonable, as a belligerent could not
he expected to grant release to an enemy vessel which
is in his po,ver and which i:£ released is adapted to conl'ersion into an enemy vessel o:f war.
4448-36--6
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. .:-\. belligerent \Youlcl not only haYe the right to inspect
a 1nerchant vessel of an ene1ny in order to cleter1nine
\Yhether it is adapted for conversion into a vessel of "'ar,
but this \Yould also see1n to be an essential precaution.
A neutral in the ordinary exercise of clue diligence
'voulcl, ho,vever, be concerned \Yith the entrance and sojourn \Yithin its \Vaters o.f ve,s.sels of belligerents \Yhich
had already been converted into vessels of \Yar or \vhich
fro1n external appearances \Yere to be used for hostile
purposes. '_fhere is no obligation resting upon a. neutral
to 1nake an exa1nination of the structural character of a
ship before per1nitting it to enter its ports nor can a.
neutral be expected to knO\Y the intention as to the ultimate use of a ve..s~el \Yhich may enter or be in its ports.
If a belligerent 'Tessel. \Yith guns 1nounted or fro1n its
external appearan~e already adapted to engage in hostilities, enters a neutral jurisdiction, the neutral 1nay
prescribe or deny it such privileges as may correspond
to the neutral's conception of its obligations or rights.
The neutral ,state 1nay forbid the use of its waters to
~~ vessels of \Var or vessels assi1nila.tecl thereto " and i£
pern1itting entrance, 1nay prescribe the conditions of
SOJOUrn.
It is also for the neutral state to determine \vhat ves.sels are assi1nilated to vessels of war. The attitude of a
neutral state 1nay depend upon many circumstances, such
uS geographical proxi1nity, commercial relations, etc. If
the merchant vessels of X, having decks stiffened for the
1nounting of guns, have all been built in neutral state X,
it may be prestuned that state N n1ay kno\v of this or
1nay have it brought to its attention. By article XIV
of the ''Tashington Convention, the purpose of stiffening
-of decks is stated and state N 1nay be desirous of a voiding any act or failure to act \Yhich n1ight itnply a noniulfilln1ent of neutral obligations.
Ad1nission of vessels of war.-Hall in referring to a
Yessel converted by go,Tenunent co1nmission into a public
vessels says :
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" But though, if a Yessel so commissioned is admitted at all
,vithin the ports of the neutral, it n1ust be accorded the full privileges attached to its public character, there is no international
u:-:age which dictates that ships of war shall be allowed to enter
foreign ports, except in cases of imminent danger or urgent need.
It is fully recognised that a state may either refuse such admission altogether, or 1nay limit the enjoyn1ent of the privilege by
whatever regulations it n1ay choose to lay down" (International
J_..aw, 8th edition, p. 746.)

Regul(J)tion of entrance of vessels of toar.-Neutrals
have 1naintainecl the right to regulate the entrance and
sojourn of vessels of 'var. rfhe regulations have SOllletimes been dra 'vn up before the 'var and sometilnes proclaimed after the 'var. Objections have been raised to
regulations proclain1ed after the 'var but these have not
been sustained because a neutral has the right to take
action for preserving its neutrality.
Identic rules 'vere agreed to by Denmark, Norway, and
s,veden in Dece1nber 1912 as follows:
'' 'Var ve~~els of lJelligerent powers are permitted to enter ports
.a nd roadsteads as well as other territorial waters of the kingdom .
.At the san1e time athnission is subject to the exception~, restrictions, and conditions which follow:
"1. (a) It is forbidden belligerent war vessels to enter the
ports and roadsteads of war, which have been proclaimed as such.
" (b) It is also forbiddent such vessels to enter territorial
waters whose entrances are closed by submarine tnines or other
n1eans of defense.
" (c) The King reserves the right to forbid under the sa1ne
conditions to the two belligerent parties, access to other Norwegian ports or roadsteads and other defined parts of the interior
Norwegian waters, when special circumstances demand and for
safeguarding the soYereign rights of the kingdom and to tnaintain
its neutrality.
'' (d) The King also reserves the right to forbid access to ports
and roadsteads of the kingdom to belligerent war vessels which
lw Ye neglected to conform to rules and prescriptions promulgated
ty the competent authorities of the kingd01n and which have vio1f,ted its neutrality." (1917 Naval 'Var College, International
Law Documents, p. 184.)

.

Vessels assi1nilated to vessels of w~al·.-The treatment
of vessels assi1nilatecl to vessels of 'var has varied in
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many 'va.ys and in different states. The practice in regard to armed merchant vessels was somewhat fully
considered at the Naval 'Var College in 1927 (1927 Naval
"\~Var
College, International La'v Situations, pp.
73-105), showing wide divergence in practice and a drift
tow·ard treating armed merchant ve.ssels under the same
rules as vessels of 'var.
Many states put restrictions upon the entrance of
vessels which might from their equipment participate in
the 'var either directly by engaging in hostilities or indirectly by supporting the belligerents as auxiliaries.
Certain .states permitting entrance of armed merchant
Yessels restricted such armament to defensive armament,
hut found difficulty in making the distinction between
snch vessels as were intended .for purposes of war and
those 'vhich were not so intended. So many controversies arose on this 1natter that the safe course seemed to
be to treat armed vessels as vessels of 'var.
The Netherlands regulations of August 5, 1014, issued
before the controversy had becon1e acute, state:
"ARTICLE 4. No "·arships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to any of the belligerents shall haYe access to the said
territory. "

An earlier procla1nation of JuJy 30, 1914, stated:
"ARTICLE 2. As long as the Order Inentionecl in Article I
(Royal Orcler of October 30, 1009) is not in force, it is forbidden
to war ships or similar Yessels of foreign powers to enter the
Netherlands territorial waters from the sea or to remain therein. H

Of course regulations did not exclude .ships in distress.
Territorial waters.-The proclan1ation excluding vessels of 'var and vessels assin1ilated thereto from territorial waters has been further complicated by varying attitudes upon the extent of territorial waters. "\Vhile
some stah~s have accepted the 3-mile lin1it, other states
have maintained claims to 4, 5, 6, 10, or 1uore 1niles as the
proper line. In the early part of the "'\Vorld War the
Italian Ambassador at Washington in a note to the Secretary of State said on November 6, 1914:
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" By note of August 13 last the Royal En1bassy had the houor
to inforn1 your excellency that under a Royal decree of the Gth
Df that month the limit of territorial waters, for the purposes of
neutrality, had be€n set at six nautical miles, and certain special
rules were laid down for the delimitation of such territorial
waters in bays, bights, and gulfs in accordance with Article 2 of
said decree. In a subsequent note of September 8 the Royal
Embassy quoted for your excellency's due information the text
of the provisions contained in the said article of the Royal decree.
Your excellency was pleased to acknowledge the said communications by your notes of August 17 and September 19-.
"Whether because of the fact that the limits of the marginal
sea are not regulated by international conventions or general rules
of international law-thus leaving every state at liberty to fix
them within the · sphere of its own sovereignty without subjecting
its decision to the recognition of the other states-or because of
the fact that no comment was made by your excellency on the
Royal Embassy's con1munications, His ~fajesty's Governn1ent
kno\vs that no objections are made by the Federal Government
to the six-mile limit set by us on our territorial waters for the
vurpose of neutrality.
"Yet, with a view to removing any possible uncertainty, His
:Majesty's Government would be very thankful for a declaration
which would explicitly convey acceptance by the Federal GovernInent of the decision as adopted. And, in compliance with instructions I have just received on the subject, I have the honor
to apply to your excellency's tried courtesy for such a declaration." (Foreign Relations, U. S., 1914, Supplement, p. 665.)

l'his note n1ade it necessary :for the United States to
reply or tacitly to admit that 6 1niles n1ight be a lawful
claim to jurisdiction. This the United States was un'villing to do and the reply :from the Acting Secretary o:f
State on N ove1nber 28, 1914, was as :follows:
" I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your excellency's
note of November 6, 1914, having reference to your previous notes
of August 13 and September 8 last, the first of which notes contained announcement that by a Royal decree of the Italian Gov-ernment, dated August 6, 1914, the limits of its territorial waters
were set at six nautical miles from the shore, and the latter of
which notes quoted the text of article 2 of that decree, prescribiug rules for the determination of the territorial waters in the
bays, bights, and gulfs which indent the Italian shore. Of these
notes I had the honor to acknowledge receipt, respectively, on
August 17 and September 19 last gone.

78

IXLA:XD STATE AT 'V AR

"In ~· our note of November 6 your excellency says that in order
to remove any possible uncertainty respecting the position of this
GoYernn1ent, you will appreciate an explicit declaration on behalf
of the United Stntes accepting the decision of the Italian Gon-'rnwent as en1bodied in the Royal decree refen·ed to.
"I a1n con1pelled to infol'ln your excellen~y of my inability to
ntcept the princivle of the Royal decree in so far as it nu1~· undertake to extend the limits of the territorial waters beyond three
nautical mile~ from the Inain shore line and to extend thereover
the jurisdiction of the Italian GoYernment.
"An examination into the question involved leads to the con<·1usion that the territorial jurisdiction of a nation over the
waters of the sea which wash its shore is now generally recoguize(l
b.r the principal nations to extend to the distance of one 1narine
l(lague or three nautical n1iles, that the Government of the United
States appears to haYe uniformly supportE·d this rule, and that
the right of a nation to extend, by domestic ordinance, it~ jurisdktion beyond thi~ lin1it bas not been acqtri€sced in hy the Governinent of the United States.
" There are certain reasons, brought fonvard fron1 time to time
in the discus~ion of this question and adyanced by writer~ on
international law, why the maritime nations might deem the
way clear to extend this determined limit of three miles, in view
of the great illllH'OYenlent in gunnery and of the extended dis·
tance to which, from the shore, the rights of nations could be
l1efended; but it seems rnanife~tly in1portant that such a construction or change of the rule should be reduced to a precise propu:;:ition and should then receive in son1e 1nanner reciprocal acknowledgnlent from the principal maritime vowers; in fine, that
the extent of the open or high seas should better be the re~ult of
~o1ne concerted understanding by the nations who~e ve:ssels sail
tllem than be left to the deter111ination of each particular nation,
iutluenced by the intere~ts which nuly be peculiar to it." (Ibid.,
p. 665.)

Internmtent of the '~Farn ", 1915.-Jnst "·hat vc.ssels
1uay be included in the category of vessels assi1nilated to
Yessels of ''ar has not been specifically determined.
Armament or flag n1ight be the deter1nining factor in
sotne cases, and cond net 1night be considered in other
cases. Use 'Yas offered as the ground of intern1nent of the
FaPn in 1915. The Secretary of State, in reply to a comnlunication of the British Ambassador requesting the rel(~ase of the Farn as being a prize brought into San J nan

ARMED MERCHANT VESSEL

79

and not departing at once in accord with article 21 of
Hague Convention XIII, said:
" I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your excelnote of the 26th ultimo in relation to the steamship·
Farn, or I<D-3, which has been interned in the port of San Juan,
Porto Rico, as a tender to a belligerent fleet. The Department is
ndvisecl that the Farn left Cardiff about September 5, 1914, for
1\lontevideo, with a clause in her charter to deliver coal to warships if they so desired. Though, as you state, the vessel was·
not etnployed as a collier, or otherwise, in the Adtniralty service,
this fact would not in the opinion of the Departn1ent affect her
status at the time of internment if she indeed acted as a collier
or auxiliary to a belligerent fleet. It is understood that the
Farn was a British tnerchant vessel; that she had on board a
cargo of Cardiff coal atnounting to s01ne 3,000 tons; that she was
captured by the Gennan cru:.ser J(arl.<:sruhe on October 5; that
the cruiser placed a nrize crew and officers on board; and that
notwithstanding the known practice of the J(a.rlsrultc to sink
her enemy prizes, the vessel had been at sea continuously since
the date of capture until she put into the port of San Juan on
January 12 last for provisions and water. The Department believes that the only reasonable conclusion in the circumstances,
is that betwe-en October 5 and January 12 the Fant was used as
a tender to German warships. It appears obvious that a belligerent may use a prize in its sen·ice and that the prize thereby becomes stamped with a character dependent upon the nature
of the service. It is upon this view of the case that the United
States Government concluded to treat the vessel as a tender,
which character accords with her presumed service to the German fleet." (Foreign Relations, U. S., 1915 Supplement, p. 823.)
lency~s

Ar1ned 1nerchant ?., essel.-The problem of the arn1ed
merchant vessels perplexed neutrals cltu~ing the \\T orld
\Var and "·as the. subject of 1nany exchanges of diploIllatic notes. A proposal w·hich brought the issue clearly
to the attention of the belligerents ·was 1nade by Secretary Lansing in ,Jan nary 1916. The coininunication of
January 18~ 1916, which 'vas sent to the British, French,
and Russian ambassadors and the Belgian 1ninister diseusses the use of subn1arines in the war up to that date.
This document, 'vhich has been often cited, contains con1n1ents on what Secretary Lansing tern1s " a doubtful legal
right " and expresses the hope that the belligerents n1ay
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ngree to a reciprocal and reasonable arrangmnent 'vith
view to ending subn1arine attacks upon merchant vessels:
" In order to bring submarine warfare within the general rules
of international law and the principles of humanity without destroying its efficiency in the destruction of commerce, I believe
that a formula may be found which, though it may require slight
modifications of the practice generally followed by nations prior
to the employment of submarines, will appeal to the sense of justice and fairness of all the belligerents in the present war.
'' Your excellency will understand that in seeking a formula or
rule of this nature I approach it of necessity from the point of
view of a neutral, but I believe that it will be equally efficacious
in preserving the lives of all non-combatants on merchant Yessels
of belligerent nationality.
"l\Iy comments on this subject are predicated on the following
propositions :
1. A non-combatant bas a right to traverse the high seas in a
merchant Yessel entitled to fly a belligerent flag and to rely upon
tl1e obserYance of the rules of international law and principles of
humanity if the vessel is approached by a na Yal vessel of another
belligerent.
2. A merchant vessel of enemy nationality should not be attucked without being ordered to stop.
3. An enemy merchant vessel, when ordered to do so by a
belligerent submarine, should immediately stop.
4. Such vessel should not be attacked after being ordered to
stop unless it attempts to flee or to resist, and in case it ceases
to flee or resist, the attack should discontinue.
5. In the event that it is impossible to place a prize crew on
board of an ene1ny merchant vessel or convoy it into port, the
vessel may be sunk, provided the crew and passengers have been
removed to a place of safety.
"In complying with the foregoing propositions which, in my
opinion, embody the principal rules, the strict observance of which
will insure the life of a non-combatant on a merchant vessel which
is intercepted by a submarine, I am not unmindful of the obstacles
which would be met by undersea craft as commerce destroyers.
"Prior to the year 1915 belligerent operations against ene1ny
cc.mmerce on the high seas hp.d been conducted with cruisers
-currying heavy ar1naments. Under these conditions international
law appeared to permit a merchant vessel to carry an arma1nent
for defensive purposes without losing its character as a private
.commercial Yessel. This right seems to haYe been 11:·edicatcd on
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the superior defensive strength of ships of war, and the limitation of armament to have been dependent on the fact that it
could not be used effectively in offense against enemy naval vessels, while it could defend the merchantman against the generally
inferior armament of piratical ships and privateers.
"The use of the submarine, however, has changed these relaOons. Comparison of the defensive strength of a cruiser and a
submarine shows that the latter, relying for protection on its
power to submerge, is almost defenseless in point of construction.
Even a merchant ship carrying a small caliber gun would be able
to use it effectively for offense against a submarine. Moreover,
pirates and sea rovers have been swept from the n1ain trade channels of the seas, and privateering has been abolished. Consequently, the placing of guns on merchantmen at the present day
uf submarine warfare can be explained only on the ground of a
purpose to render merchantmen superior in force to submarines
and to prevent warning and visit and search by them. Any armament, therefore, on a merchant vessel would seem to have the
c'!Jaracter of an offensive armament.
"If a submarine is required to stop and search a merchant
VPSsel on the high seas and, in case it is found that she is of
enemy character ancl that conditions necessitate her destruction,
to remove to a place of safety all persons on board, it would
not seem just or reasonable that the submarine should be compelled, while complying with these requirements, to expose itself
to almost certain destruction by the guns on board the merchant
vessel.
" It would, therefore, appear to be a reasonable and reciprocally just arrangement if it could be agreed by the opposing belligerents that submarines should be caused to adhere strictly to
the rules of international law in the matter of stopping and searching merchant vessels, determining their belligerent nationality,
and removing the crews and passengers to places of safety before
sinking the vessels as prizes of war, and that merchant vessels
of belligerent nationality should be prohibited and prevented from
carrying any armament whatsoever.
" In presenting this formula as a basis for conditional declarations by the belligerent governments, I do so in the full conviction
tlJat your Government will consider primarily the humane purpose of saving the lives of innocent people rather than the insJstence upon a doubtful legal right which may be denied on
account of new conditions." (Foreign Relations, U. S., 1916, Supplement, p. 146.)

The American proposition was not adopted.
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.Adnd~sion

of sub1narines.-The British Govern1nent
set forth its opinion in regard to the closing of neutral
ports to sub1narines in a com1nunication to the Secretary
of State on July 3, 1916:
"The ene1ny submarines have been endeavouring for nearly
eighteen months to prey upon the Allied and neutral com1nerce,
and throughout that period enemy governments haYe never
claimed that their subn1arines were entitled to obtain supplies
fr01n neutral ports. This must llaYe been clue to the fact that
they thought they would be 1net with a refusal and that hospitality could not be claimed as of right. The difficulty of knowing the movements or controlling the subsequent action of the
submarines renders it impossible for the neutral to guard against
any breaches of neutrality after the submarine has left port and
justifies the neutral in drawing a distinction between surface
ships and submarines. The latter, it. is thought, should be
treated on the same footing as seaplanes or other aircraft and
should not be allowed to enter neutral ports at all. This is the
rule prescribed during the present war by Norway and Sweden .
.Another point of distinction between surface ships and submarines should be borne in mind. A surface Yessel demanding
the hospitality of a neutral port runs certain inevitable risks;
its whereabouts bec01ne l{nown and an enemy cruiser can await
its departure frOin port. This and similar facts put a check on
the abuse by belligerant surface ships of neutral hospitality. No
such disadvantages limit the use to which the Germans might
put neutral ports as bases of supplies for submarine raiders.
" For these reasons, in the opinion of His :Majesty's Govennnent,
1f any enemy sub1narine attempts to enter a neutral port, perlllission should be refused by the authorities. If the submarine
enters it should be interned unless it bas been driven into port by
necessity. In the latter case it should lJe allowed to depart as
soon as necessity is at an end. In no circumstances should it be
allowed to obtain supplies.
"If a subinarine should enter a neutral port flying the mercantile flag His :l\lajesty's Government are of opinion that it is the
,duty of the neutral authorities concerned to enquire closely into
its right to fly that flag, to inspect the Yessel thoroughly a1ul, in
the event of torpedoes, torpedo tubes or guns being found on board,
to refuse to recognise it as a merchant ship." (Foreign Helations,
U. S., 1916, Supplement, p. 766.)

It is difficult to reconcile this position, if taken in regard to a 1nerchant sub1narine 'vith the attitude of the
-British to,vard other ar1ned 1nerchant vessels. In August

83

AlV£ERICA.X ATTITUDE

1916 the Allied Govern1nent in identic notes stated to
the United States that:
'' Submarine vessels should be excluded fro1n the benefit of the
rules hitherto recognized by the law of nations regarding the
admission of vessels of war or merchant vessels into neutral
waters, roadsteads, or ports, and their sojourn in them.
"Any belligerent submarine entering a neutral port should be
·detained there." (Ibid., p. 770.)

In its reply the United States Govern1nent said:
"In the opinion of the Government of the "United States the
Allied powers have not set forth any circun1stances, 11or is the
Government of tlle United States at vresent aware of any circumstances, coneerning the use of war or n1erchant submarines which
would render the existing rules of international law inapplicable
to them. In view of this fact and of the notice and warning of
the Allie(l powers announced in their metnoranda under acknowledgment, it is incu1nbent upon the Government of the United
States to notify the GoYernments of France, Great Britain, Russia,
~J.nd Japan that, so far as the treatment of either war or tnerchant
}'Ubtnarines in American waters is concerned, the GoYernment of
the United States reserYes its liberty of action in all respect~ an<l
\Viii treat such vessels as, in its opinion, becomes the action of a
power which may he said to ha ,.e taken the first steps toward
establishing the 1n·inciples of neutrality and which for over a
century has maintained those princi})les in the tra<litional spirit
und with the high sense of iml)hrtiality in which the;\· \vere conceived." (Ibid, p. 771.)

N or,vay and other po,vers had indicated that they also
1·egarded the existing principle of international la'' as
applicable to subn1a1;ines.
Am.er-ican OJY/nion, January 1917.-A case showing that
the United States 'vas endeaYoring to clarify its position
en anned 1nerchant vessels arose in consequence of the
action of the French S. S. J.1fississippi in late 1916. This
js set forth in a letter fro1n the Secretary of State to the
French An1bassador:
""\VASHINGTON,
~IY

January 6, 191''i.

DEAR :i\IR. A~IBASSADOR: It has been brought to this Dermrtinent's attention thn.t on NoYember 8 last the French S. S.
Jlississippi tired on a submarine in the English Channel prior to
warning or attack hy the sub1narine. This report is virtually con''
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firmed by the affidavits of the first lieutenant, the second captain,
aud the second lieutenant of the vessel, which is now at the port
of New York. The following statement frOin the nffidaYit of the
second lieutenant is pertinent:
" ' l\Iy station ·was at the stern in command of the gun, and the
c:.1ptain told me to be prepared to fire at the submarine at a range
of about 4,000 yards. The captain sent the second captain to the
stern to instruct me to fire one shot when he gave the signal. The
captain gave the signal by raising his hand and I fired one shot,
ned reloaded the gun and remained ready to fire another.'
"The facts before the Department indicate that this action 'vas
initiated by the Mississippi and therefore offensive in its naturea circumstance which might well be regarded as placing this vessel
in the class of offensively armed ships, to which this Government
is firmly convinced the hospitality usually granted to merchnntIaen in United States ports 1nay be denied. As, however, this is
the first instance of the sort which has come to my Government's
notice, and out of regard to the possibility of a mistake in this
case, the vessel will be allowed to depart as usual, on your Government's assurance. I 'vould, however, be remiss in my duty
if I did not bring this case to your notice with the request that
it be brought to your Governn1ent's attention, with the opinion
oi my Government, as herein expressed.
"In this relation I attach a copy of instructions said to have
been issued by your Government to merchant sea captains, and in
force in October and November last on French vessels. These
instructions (if genuine) lay the armament on merchant vessels
of France open at least to the inference that its purpose is for
offensive attack on submarines of the enemy. I have, therefore,
to ask that you be good enough to advise me nt the earliest moment as to whether these instructions have been issued to the
masters of French merchant vessels by your Government and are
now in force. I would be grateful if you could inform me on
these points as soon as possible.
"I am, etc.
ROBERT LANSING."
(Foreign Relations, U. S., 1917, Supplement I, p. 544.)

As the United States entered the 'var within a few
n1onths there see1ns to have been no ans,ver to this comInunication.
Prize and neutral JJOJ'fs.-In early days as the la,vs of
neutrality 'Yere deYeloping, the practice in regard to reception of prizes in neutral ports varied. Treaties em-
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bodying differing principles ·were negotiated :fron1 ti1ne
to time.
In the case of the Appa1n, a British yessel captured in
1917 off the 'vest coast of Africa by the German cruiser
JJJ oe1oe, 'vas brought into Ha1npton Roads, an American
port n1ore than 3,000 1niles distant. The German contention was that the bringing in and keeping of the Appantin an American port 'vas justified under article 10 of the
treaty o:f 1799 bet,veen the United States and Prussia.
(8 U. S. Stat., 172.) In the decision upon the case o:f
the Appam, the Supre1ne Court said:
Article 19 of the treaty of 1799, using the translation adopted
by the A1nerican State Department, reads as follows:
"The vessels of war, public and private, of both parties, shall
rarry [conduire] freely, wheresoever they please, the vessels and
effects taken [pris] from their enemies, without being obliged to
pay any duties, charges, or fees to officers of admiralty, of the
customs, or any others; nor shall such prizes [prises] be arrested,
searched or put under legal process, when they come to and enter
tl1e ports of the other party, but may freely be carried [conduites]
0ut again at any time by their captors [le vaisseau preneur] to
the places expressed in their commissions, which the commanding
officer of such vessel [le dit vaisseau] shall be obliged to show.
(But conformably to the treaties existing between the United
States and Great Britain, no vessel [vaisseau] that shall have
made a prize [prise] upon British subjects shall have a right to
shelter in the ports of the United States, but if [il est] forced
therein by tempests, or any other danger, or accident of the sea,
they [il sera] shall be obliged to depart as soon as possible.)"
The provision concerning the treaties between the United States
and Great Britain is no longer in force, having been mnitted by
the treaty of 1828 [8 Stat. L. 378]. See Compilation of Treaties in
Force, 1904, pages 641 and 646.
"\Ve think an analysis of this article makes manifest that the
permission granted is to vessels of war and their prizes, which
are not to be arrested, searched, or put under legal process when
they come into the ports of the high contracting parties, to the
end that they may be freely carried out by their captors to the
places expressed in their commissions, which the comn1anding
officer is obliged to show. 'Vhen the Appmn can1e into the American harbor she was not in charge of a vessel of war of the Gennan
Empire. She was a merchant vessel, captured on the high seas
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and :::-ent into the Amerkan 11ort with the intl'ntion of being kept
there indefinitely, and without any means of ll•aYillg that port for ·
another, as contemplated in the treaty, and required to be shown
ii1 the eommission of the Yt~ssel bringing in the prize. Certainly
:-:ueh use of a neutral port is Yerr far from that contemplated by
a treaty which made lH'OYision only for temvorar;r asylum for certain purposes, and can not be held to imply an intention to make
of an American port a harbor of refuge for captured prizes of a
belligerent GoYernnwnt. ""'e ean not aYoid the conclusion that in
thus 1naking use of an American port there was a clear breach of
the neutral rights of this GoYernment, as recognized under lH'indple~ of internationa I law goYerning the obligations of neutral~,
and that such use of one of our ports was in no wise sanctioned
by the treaty of 179!>. (242 U. S. Supren1e Court Re110rts, 124;
!'Pe also 1922 Kaval ""'ar College, International Law Deeisions, v.
160.)

In general during the ,.Vorlcl 'Var nentral states prohibited the entrance of prize to their territorial "TatPrs
c·xcept in case of distress, shortage of fuel or coal.
XIII Hague Convention, 1907, provided in regard to
thE.l entrance of prize to neutral 'vaters. and the Alnerican attitude tolvard these proYisions "~as stated in the
case of the Appa1n cited above.
'' This policy of the American Govern1nent was e1nphasized in
its attitude at The Hague Conference of 1907. Article 21 of Tlle·
Hague treaty lH'OYides :
'''A 1n·ize may only be brought into a neutral port on account
of un~ea worthinPss, stress of wen ther, or want of fuel or JH'oyisions .
., 'It n1u::;t lea Ye as soon as the circumstances which ju~tified
i1~ entry are at an end.
If it does not, the neutral power must
order it to leaYe at once; should it fail to obey, tlw neutral power
must etn}l1oy the means at its dis11osal to relea~e it with its
1 ,ffieers and crew and to intern the lH'ize crew.'
''Article 22 proYides:
"'A neutral power tnust, similarly, release a prize brought int(}
(:ne of its ports under circumstances other than those referred to
in article 21.'
"To these article~, adherenee was given by Belgium, ]!.,ranee,
Au:-;tria-IIungary, Gernuu1~·, the United States, alHl a number of
•:the1· na tioll~. They were 11ot ratified by the British Government.
This GoYennnent refused to adhere to article 23, \Vhich IH'oYides:
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" 'A neutral vower may allow vrizes to enter its port~ and
roadsteads, \Yhether under conYoy or not, when they are brought
tLere to be sequestrated pending the decision of a prize court.' "
(1022 XaYal War College, International Law Decisions, v. H>D.)

Brazil in lVorld lVar, 1914-18.-By decree no. 11,03"{
0£ . .t\..ugu,st 4, 1914, Brazil announced detailed rules of
neutrality. The rules "'ere reaffir1ned as other states
later joined in ""ar. In earlier 'yars, Brazilian rnles
have also been very co1nprehensive. During the
orld
'Var, Brazil fro1n time to ti1ne n1odified the regulations .
..._~rticle 20, which 'Yas issued on . .-\..ugust 4, 1914, read as
:follows:

'T

·'The ca11tures nml1e hy a lJelligerent may only he lJrought to a
Brazilian port in ca~e of nns.eawortiliness, stress of \\"('ather. lack
of fuel or food vrm·i~ions, and also u1uler tlw eon<lition:-; proYided hereinbelo,,· in Article 21st.
"The prize n1ust depart as soon as the eause or causes of her
arrintl cea~e. Failing that d('va rture, the Brazil" an authorit)
"·ill notify the commander of tile vrize to le~n·e at once. atHl. if
not obeyed, will tal{e the necessary measures to ha,·e the prize
released with her officers and crew, and to intern the prize crew
placed on board by the captor.
" Any prize entering a Brazilian port or harbor, except under
the aforesaid four conditions, will be likewise released." ( 1916
XaYal """ar College, International Law Topics, p. 1:3.)

By degree no. 11.093 of August 24, 1914, a fifth condition of entrance 'vith prize was published a,s follo,vs:
" In any one of the hy11othe~e!-' of tile Artieles 20 and :21 tile
Brazilian Gm·ernment re:-:erYes to itself tile right to demand the
disembarking fron1 on boanl the prizes of the 1nercbandise
destined to Brazil.'' (1017 Xan1l ""ar College, International
La \Y Doctnnen ts, p. 6:2.)

Other changes in Brazilian neutrality rules "·ere also
announced.
League of 1Vation.s and co1nrJnwnications.-"C"nder article
23 of the CoYenant of the League of :Kations. the Inenlbers of the League of X ations~ subject to the proYisions .
0£ international conYentions~ agree that they:
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'· (e) wHI make provisions to secure and maintain freed urn of
comJnunieations anll of transit and equitable treatment, for the
commerce of all members of the League."

To carry out this agree1nent and follo,ving certain preluninary investigations, the first General Conference on
Com1nunications and Transit 'vas held at Barcelona on
l\farch 10 to April 20, 1921.
The .A.dvisory and Technical Conunittee for Co1nn1unications and 'Transit of the League also "'"orked upon the
san1e subject. The object of the conference 'vas to deYise n1easures to re1nove interference with international
transport and to take steps toward "rendering international friction less frequent and diminishing the risk of
·v;;ar." 'The conyentions agreed upon at the Barcelona
Conference "~ere to apply in ti1ne of war "as far as
u1ight be con1patibl2." The conference also recognized
the possibility of special regulations depending upon
regional or geographical circumstances.
Transport in tran.sit.-The question of transport in
transit had been defined as " transport which crosses a
~tate, its points of departure and destination being outside that state." In the explanation of this term, the
report says:
"Transport of this kind is specially in need of international
guarantees. In the case of the transport of exports and imports,
n State which obstructs or prevents free movement of such translJort may indirectly cause serious prejudice to the economic reconstruction of the world. In this way it injures eYery State, but
it directly injures only, either those exporting States the transport of whose goods it preYents or obstructs in the course of importation, or those importing States which may, for instance, be
h1 need of raw materials, which the obstructing State possesses,
2nd the export of which it prohibits. As regards transport in
transit, on the other hand, any interruption or obstruction injures
third parties, both the States which export and those which import the products, the passage of which bas been prevented. Such
~n interruption of traffic inevitably causes reprisals and countereffects, the results of which cannot be limited.
"The International Convention of Barcelona on Freedom of
Transit is, therefore, designed to prevent interruption or obstruction of this kind. "\Yith this object it provides-making due al-
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lowance, of course, for legitimate restrictions as regards police,
national security, transport in war-time, etc., and also for the
need of adapting its measures to the existing legal position, and
to the local or regional conditions in various parts of the worldfor complete freedo111 of transit and complete equality of transit
conditions." (League of Nations. A45.1921.VIII, p. 3.)

The provisions in regard to transport in transit 'vere
in principle to apply to traffic overland or by water.
Transit through the LVetherlands, 1918.-Probleins
arose during the \Vorld \Var in regard to the transit of
goods and persons across Limburg from Ger1nany into
Belgium. The American ~finister reported from The
Hague, April 23, 1918, that:
" Germany has within the last few days demanded of Holland :
"(1) Removal of vexations customs examinations at the frontiers;
"(2) Passage of civil goods on the Limburg railways, frmn
1\Iiinchen-Gladbach via Roermond to Antwerp;
"(3) That the Rhine convention shall be understood as Germany understands it, namely, that everything goes through in
"·ar, as in peace;
" ( 4) Unrestricted and uncontrolled transit of sand and gravel;
.and" (5) That troops and munitions shall be allowed to pass through
Limburg.
''The best obtainable information is to the effect that den1and
.uumber 5 has not actually been presented to the Dutch Government, but that a statement regarding it was handed in by German
Legation through ' mistake' with the four other demands. The
Austrian :Minister, I learn from what I consider to be perfectly
good authority, was informed by his German colleague of the
presentation of the first four demands, and he learned about the
fifth demand only through the British Charge d'Affairs, the Dutch
l\Iinister of Foreign Affairs having told Sir -nr alter To,vnley of it
and he having told a go-between. ~oudon, Treub and, so far as
1 can learn, the members of the Government as a rule, and the
nu tell Arn1y pretend publicly to believe that these German demands are nothing but a bluff and that they are not in the least
worried about the1n. Bluff or not, they produce a situation that
T. . oudon states privately he considers serious.
'' German policy is now controlled entirely fro1n General Head.quarters. Nobody doubts that they would order Holland entered
4448-36--7
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for their own purposes, at any time, if they thought they had anytl:iing to get thereby. The demand for the passage of troops and
In~nitions through Limburg, if it should be made, would not
differ in its effects from a demand for the use of the Scheidt,
or a demand for the use of any other part of Dutch tenitory.
The Dutch would resent it and though I find that Entente military circles here believe or profess to believe that the Dutch Army
would fight, there are other well-informed circles that think that
the Dutch would not go beyond a breaking off of diplomatic relations with the Central Powers and the necessary formal protests."
(Foreign Relations, U. S., 1918, Suppleinent,. p. 1797.)

1Vavigable waterways.-The Treaty of Versailles, June
28: 1'919, in effect January 10, 1920, provided for certain
navigable "~ater,vays in article 331:
"The following rivers are declared international:
"the Elbe (Labe) from its confluence with the Yltava (l\Ioldau),
and the Vltava (~loldau) frmn Prague:
"the Oder ( Odra) from its confluence with the Oppa;
"the Niemen (Russstrom-1\Iemel-Niemen) from Grodno;
" the Danube from Ulm;
"and all navigable parts of these river systems which naturally
provide more than one State with access to the sea, with or without transshipment from one vessel to another; together with lateral
canals and channels constructed either to duplicate or to improve
naturally navigable sections of the specified river systems, or to
('Onnect two naturally navigable sections of the same river."
(1919 Naval "\Yar College, International Law Documents, p. 160.)

. A..t the Barcelona Conference in 1921 further suggestions 'vere made which were embodied in a statute which
defined rivers of international concern:
"ARTICLE 1. In the application of the Statute, the following are
declared to be navigable waterways of international concern:
"1. All parts which are naturally navigable to and from the sea
of a waterway which in its course, naturally navigable to and
from the sea, separates or traverses different States, and also
any part of any other waterway naturally navigable to and from
t he sea, which connects with the sea a watenvay naturally
navigable which separates or traverses different States.'"
(League of Nations Documents, 0.479.l\L327.1921.VIII, p. 17.)
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A. erial LVavigation.-The Treaty of Versailles, in pro~
viding for aerial navigation, in article 314 made specific
provision in regard to Germany as follows :
"The aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall, while
in transit to any foreign country whatever, enjoy the right of
flying over the territory and territorial waters of Germany without landing, subject always to any regulations which may be made
by Germany, and which shall be applicable equally to the aircraft of Germany and to those of the Allied and Associated
countries."

These conditions were regarded as imposed obligations
to remain in force till January 1, 1923, unle$ Germany
'vas earlier admitted to adhere to the Aerial Navigation
Convention or had become a member of the League of
Nations.
Aircraft over the Straits.-A convention on the Regime
of the Straits signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923, provides
for freedom of transit and of navigation by sea and by
air of the Strait of Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and
the Bosphorus. 'Turkey ratified this convention on
l\farch 31, 1924, and British, Italian, Japanese, and
:French ratifications were deposited later in 1924.
In the annex stating the rules for passage of vessels
and aircraft, there are provisions regulating the details
o:f passage:
"1. (b). In Time of 1Var, Turkey being Neutral.

'·Complete freedom of navigation and passage by day and night
under the same conditions as above. The duties and rights of
Turkey as a neutral Power cannot authorize her to take any measures liable to interfere with navigation through the Straits, the
waters of which, and the air above which, must remain entirely
free in time of war, Turkey being neutral just as in time of
peace." * * *
" 2. (b) . In Time of War, Turkey being N eutraZ.

"Complete freedom of passage by day and by night under any
flag, without any formalities, or tax, or charge whatever, under
the same limitations as in paragraph 2 (a).
" However, these lhnitations will not be applicable to any belligerent Power to the prejudice of its belligerent rights in the
P.!ack Sea.
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"The rights and duties of Turkey as a neutral Power cannot
authorise her to take any measures liable to interfere with navigntion through the Straits, the waters of which, and the air
alwYe which, must remain entirely free in time of war, Turkey
being neutral, just as in time of peace.
" "\Yarships and military aircraft of belligerents will be forbidden to make any capture, to exercise the right of visit and
search, or to carry out any other hostile act in the Straits.
"As regards revictualling and carrying out repairs, war vessels
will be subject to the terms of the Thirteenth Hague Convention
cf 1907, dealing with maritime neutrality.
":Military aircraft will receive in the Straits similar treatinent
to that accorded under the Thirteenth Hague Convention of 1907
to warships, pending the conclusion of an international Convention establishing the rules of neutrality for aircraft." (2 Hudson,
International Legislation, pp. 1030, 1032.)
Panan~a

Oanal.-The procla1nation of the United
States, N oYeinber 13, 1914, in regard to the Panama Canal
contained rules in regard to the Canal: 1
'• RULE 15. Aircraft of a belligerent power, public or private,
:are forbidden to descend or arise within the jurisdiction of the
United States at the Canal Zone, or to pass through the air
spaces above the lands and waters within said jurisdiction.
"RuLE 16. For the purpose of these rules the Canal Zone in-cludes the cities of Panama and Colon and the harbors adjacent
to the said cities." (1915 Naval "\Var College, International Law
Topics, p. 11; 38 U. S. Stat., p. 2039.)

After the United States becan1e a belligerent po,ver it
\-vas necessary to amend these rules and on May 23, 1917,
it was proclaimed that:
/
" RuLE 13. Aircraft, public or private, of a belligerent, other
than the United States, are forbidden to descend or arise within
the jurisdiction of the United States at the Canal Zone, or to pass
through the air spaces above the lands and waters within said
jurisdiction.
"RuLE 14. For the purpose of these rules the Canal Zone includes the cities of Panama and Colon and the harbors adjacent
to the said cities." (Foreign Relations, U. S., 1917, Supplement
II, p. 1267.)
1 For canals in wartime, see 1930 Naval 'Var College, International
Law Situations, pp. 115-134.
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Suez Oanal, 1915.-A circular of May 1915 gave the
Turkish point of vie·w in regard to the status of the Suez
Canal:
" Considering tlla t the British Government not only has failed
to observe, in reference to the powers, the engagements to which
it is bound by the convention of 1888, stipulating that no war
vessel can remain in the Suez Canal, but also it is now fortifying
the canal, while, on the other hand, the French Government, in
Yiew of hostile action against the Ottoman En1pire, has landed
troops in Egypt, the Imperial Ottoman Government, by reason of
these facts, considers itself under the imperious necessity of taking military measures for the protection of the imperial territory,
of which Egypt forms a part, and of extending hostilities to the
Suez Canal. If such measures cause any injury whatever to neutral vessels, it is thus evident" that the responsibility will be upon
the French and British Governments." (1917 Naval War College,
International Law Documents, p. 221.)

Jfarginal air zone.-At the meeting of the Co1nmission
of Jurists at The Hague in 1923, the Italian delegation
proposed that along the seacoast there should be an air
belt under national jurisdiction extending sea·ward ten
1niles. This \vas not acceptable to the commission. It
\vas argued that such a provision would give rise to confusion, that jurisdiction in the air should be appurtenant
to the subjacent jurisdiction, that it would enlarge the
area of neutral obligation \Yithout "compensating advantages", and would 1nake it more difficult for aircraft to
deter1nine 'vith precision their location and to act accordingly. It \Yas also pointed out that if the ten-mile air
zone \vas adopted by a neutral, the belligerent aircraft
n1ight alight on the sea and pass at once out of the neutral jurisdiction. (1924 Naval 'Var College, Internatjonal La'v Docu1nents, p. 152.) It has also been pointed
out that under such a rule a yessel of \var, surface or
sub1narine, 1night on passing \vithin ten n1iles of a neutral
shore be exempt fro1n aerial attack~ and it should be
pointed out that the aircraft \vould not be exempt from
attack by anti-aircraft guns of the enemy vessels.
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A statement of the Italian delegation nevertheless
Jnaintained that:
"3. From the point of view both of belligerent and of neutral
States, there are reasons of the highest juridical and technical
importance which make it indispensable to allow each State the
power of including in its jurisdiction the atmospheric space to a
distance of 10 miles from its coast.
" 4. The difficulties resulting frmn the difference bet\veen the
· Yddth of the marginal ~ir-belt and the width of national territorial waters would not ~ee1n to be ~o. sericns as to render thl'
Italian proposal unacceptable in practice.
"5. In any case, there is no juridical obstacle to the fixing of
tlle same width of space for the marginal air-belt as for territorial
waters, the Italian Delegation being of opinion that international
law, as generally recognised, contains no rule prohibiting a State
fro1n extending its territorial waters to a distance of 10 sea-miles
from its coasts." (Ibid, p. 153.)

It is evident that 'vhile aerial navigation 1nay and does
call for further regulations, such regulations should be
based upon a con1prehensive understanding of all their
b~arings upon accepted la,vs relating to other jurisdiction. Action by a single state which would atte1npt to
Inoclify the laws of 'var or neutrality in tin1e of 'var leads
to confusion and Inay lead to an extension of the 'var to
other states.
Brazil and neutrality, 1933.-In the war bet,veen Bolivia and Paraguay, Brazil declared neutrality on l\fay
23, 1933. In introducing the declaration there was a
some,vhat long explanatory statement in 'vhich it 'vas
said:
"Considering, that not being a member of the League of Nations, Brazil is not bound by the prescriptions of tl1e Pact, and
that, having to affirm its neutrality, it is guided by international
law, written and customary, and by the elevated spirit of justice
and morality which civilization has inculcated in the conscienee
ot cultured peoples
"Considering, that the General Rules of Neutrality adopted by
Brazil during the 'Vorld War, prior to having been drawn into
it, and which were established by decree No. 11,037 of August 4,
1914, and completed or modified by subsequent acts, do not fully
satisfy the require1nents of the present moment, because, at the
time of their publication war in another continent was conte1n-
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plated, the acts of belligerency on the sea being those which
would nwst preoccupy the country, whereas now the strife is
between neighboring and mediterranean nations, problems of river
navigation have arisen, and while the international spirit has
greatly increased during the past ~'ears ideas regarding war have
cllanged considerably ; " * * *
"Considering, ho·wever, that in order to settle the incidents
which may arise and to govern the actions of Brazil and the
Brazilians, there is the general idea of neutrality, which consists
in the neutral State abstaining from taking part directly or indirectly in the action of the belligerents; in not disturbing in any
tvay war operations occurring outside of its territory; in not allowir.g, \Vithin it, acts of hostility; and in having assured the freedOin of its peaceful commerce, the expression of its sovereignty,
which war abroad cannot reasonably limit; deducing from this
last proposition that only the normal purpose of the 1nerchandise
and its destiny, can influence its classification as hostile or
innocent;".

vVhile the rules in regard to neutrality issued under
the declaration contained the ordinary provisions in regard to the use oi Brazilian waters by vessels of 'var, there
were also such provisions as the follo,ving:
"ARTICLE 5. It is forbidden to the belligerents to make on the
land, river, or maritime territory of the United States of Brazil, a
base of war operations or to practice acts which may constitute a
violation of Brazilian neutrality."
"ARTICLE 21. Belligerent airplanes may not fly over the territory or jurisdictional waters of Brazil without previous authorization. Those not authorized that land on Brazilian territory or
\Yaters will be detained.
"l\filitary airplanes will not be given authorization to fly over
Brazilian territory."

Neutralization of maritime areas.-Proposals were made
early in the World War to close considerable areas of the
Atlantic Ocean to belligerents or to apply the ordinary
rules of neutrality according to a geographical interpretation. It was suggested that a neutral zone in the Atlantic from the American coast to the meridian of Cape
Verde be established to prevent interJerence with American commerce. This proposition 'vas considered by the
Chilean GoYernn1ent and the follo·wing reply "~as made:
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"This GoYernment bas already been seeking means to dhninish
the disturbances which the actiYities of the belligerents off the
American coasts haYe been causing to the malitime commerce of
the nations of this continent, and had, in the first place, considered the idea of fixing a neutral zone within which said comInerce would not be disturbed. Nevertheless, a careful study of
the question leads tne to think that a 1neasure of this nature will
not be accepted by the GoYerntnent of Great Britain, and that,
even thougb it were accepted by that Government, it would not
be productiYe of any appreciable results in the sense desired. As
a n1atter of fact, it seems doubtful that the British Government
would accept a Ineasure which in reality would be of much
greater profit to Germany, whose merchant marine is now totally
paralyzed, than to England whicb still maintains a Inaritime
moYement of some vitality in American waters. On the other
hand, the efficacy of such a 1neasure would have Yery little weight
on the commercial interchange betw.een Europe and America,
because the danger would continue beyond the neutral zone,
that is to say, in European waters wherein the situation of
belligerent ships would ren1ain as it is to-day. Consequently, the
advantages of the measure would be restricted to the intercllange bet"·een American countries. Finally, the enormous extent of the neutral zone would render the surveillance required by
our neutral .duties still much n1ore difficult and costly than it is
today, unless the measure were to be a merely illusory one."
(Foreign Relations, U.S., 1914, Supplement, p. 436.)

There was also so1ne discussion as to the joint action
of the A1nerican states as to a proposition to the belligerents that " sections of the Southern Atlantic and Pacific should be closed to naval 'varfare and that the belligerents should co1ne to some agreement 'vith the Union
as to the protection of neutral shipping."
The Pan American Union on December 8, 1914, passed
a resolution favoring a com1nission to study "the probl(~ms presented by the present European 'Var " particularly as regards neutral relations.
The Peruvian Minister at Washington in a coinmunication o£ December 12, 1914, 1nentioned the proposal o£
';an American continental agreement with the object of itnposing on belligerents for the first time respect for the inviolability
of the American highways of commerce, as a new principle of
international law arising out of the needs of a situation created by
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the devastating clash of such formidable elements of force and
destruction.
"The fundamental object of the agreement which the Peruvian
Governnwnt is seeking once clearly determined, there can enter
into consideration no possibility that such an agreement may prove
injurious to this or that belligerent and meet with its more or
less open opposition. Since all that we seek is to prevent violent aggressions from being carried beyond their proper theatre
to the enormous distance at which America lies, and since in support thereof a pacific right of self-preservation is invoked, which
is obviously more worthy of respect than the right of destruction and annihilation which each belligerent claims against his
enemy, there is no occasion to ask which of the combatants will
accept it. Let us proclaim, maintain, and enforce the right of
the neutral nations, consolidated in the form of a continental
agreement, to keep hostilities· away from geographical areas not
involved in th~ natural influences and effects of the war, where
prevails a normal, valuable, and peaceful trade, which is experiencing disastrous effects to the extent of crisis and ruin, daily
aggravated by the continuance of such a state of things. The
territorial waters fiction and, to a certain degree, the very right
of asylum for ships of the belligerent countries in neutral harbors,
have as their true foundation the safeguarding of moral and
physical interests whose defense could not be subordinated to the
right of aggression, if it may be so called, of one belligerent
against the other. Respect of territorial waters and of vessels
.ac·corded asylum was enforced without ascertaining 'vho n1ight
complain against those principles being put in practice; it was
euough to know that they were the result of justified necessity,
and the principles have grown to the estate of a right and of a
Tight that is compulsory." (Ibid., p. 445.)

In some o£ the South American states such proposi6ons as related to neutralization met with little response
and the American Legation in Brazil reported on December 11', 1914:
" The members of the Foreign Office are particularly jubilant
ever what is considered a decided success for their initiative. In
business circles and among those not directly connected with the
Government it must be confessed that there is no special enthusiasnl on this subject as it seems to be the general opinion
that little of practical importance can be acco1nplished by the
Pan American Union in the premises. Now that the German war
Yessels in this part of the \Yorld haYe been destroyed, it seems to
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he the impression among practical persons that there is at present
no further need for the good offices of the union." (Ibid., p. 452.)

Attitude of United States toward S1oitzerland.-The
neutralization of Sw·itzerland had been generally respected during the \\rorld \Var, and 8\vitzerland had
shown a disposition to n1aintain its neutrality by force
'Yhen necessary. While the United States was not a party
to the neutralization treaties in regard to 8\vitzerland, it
1nade kno,Yn its attitude.
"'YASHINGTO~,

No&c1nbcr 30, 1917', 5 JJ.m.

"1171. You are instructed to fonnally present the following
communication to the l\linister of Foreign Affairs :
" 'In Yiew of the presence of American forces in Europe engaged
in the prosecution of tile war against the Imperial German Government, the Government of the United States deems it appropriate
to announce for the assurance of the Swiss Confeaeration and in
harmony with t'h e attitude of the co-belligerents of the United
States in Europe, that the United States will not fail to observe
the principle of neutrality applicable to Switzerland and the inviolability of its territory, so long as the neutrality of Switzerland
is maintained by the Confederation and respected by the enemy.
Lansing.' "
(Foreign Relations, U. S., 1917, Supplement 2, Yol. I, p. 758.)

Li1nitin g areas of hostilities.-Early in August 1914
China raised the question as to whether European belligerents might consent " not to engage in hostilities either
in Chinese territory and 1narginal waters, or in adjacent
leased territories." Propositions "concerning the possible neutralization of the Pacific Ocean " \Yere advanced.
There 'vas in early August a general desire for the Jnaintenance of the status quo in the Far East. On August 13
the German GoYerninent said:
" 1. Germany does not seek war with Japan.
"2. If Japan, on account of the treaty with England, asks that
Gerinany do nothing against English colonies, warships, or commerce in Ea~t, Germany will assent in return for corresponding
promise from England.
"3. England and Germany to reciprocally agree that either all
warships of both in East leaYe eastern waters or remain inactive
as against the other, if remaining there.
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"4..Japan, England, and Germany to agree that none of these
three shall attack warships, colonies, territory, or con1merce of
any of the others in the East.
"5. The East to mean all lands and seas between parallels
Lon don 90 east and all Pacific to Cape Horn.
'" Notify German Ambassador in Tokyo.
" If this zone is too large, smaller limits will be accepted."
(Foreign Relation~, U. S., 1914, Sp.pplen1ent, p. 169.)

Japan on August 15 proposed to Germany :
"(1) To withdraw immediately from the Japanese and Chinese
waters German men-of-war and armed Yessel~ of all kinds and to
(Usarm at once those which cannot be so withdra,vn.
"(2) To deliver on a d~te not later than September 15, 191-!,
to the Imperial .Japanese aut.horities without condition or compensation the entire leased territory of Kiaocho'\\T, with a Yiew to
eventual restoration of the same to China.
"The Imperial Japanese Government announce at the same time
that in the event of their not receiving by noon, August 23, 1914,
the answer of the Imperial German Government signifying an
'Jnconditional acceptance of the aboYe advice offered by the Impe-rial Japanese Government, they will be compelled to take such
action as they may deem necessary to meet the situation." (Ibid,
fJ. 170.)

On August 18 the British charge d'affaires in Washington coininunicated to the Secretary o:f State the :following memorandum,
"The Governments of Great Britain and Japan having been in
communication with each other are of opinion that it is necessary
for each to take action to protect the general interests in the Far
East contemplated by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, keeping specially in Yiew the independence and integrity of China as provided
for in that agreen1ent.
"It is understood that the action of Japan w·ill not extend to
the Pacific Ocean lJeyond the China Seas, except in so far as it
may be necessary to protect .Japanese shipping lines in the Pacific, nor beyond Asia tic waters westward of the China Seas, nor
to any foreign territory except territory in German occupation on
the continent of eastern Asia." (Ibid., p. 171.)

On .A.ugust 23 the Japanese informed the United States
that as Germany had :failed to make anS\Yer to the J apanese note o:f August 15, a state o:f \Var existed between
Japan and Gern1any :from noon August 23, 1914.
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In spite of discussion of li1niting the area of hostilities, no agreement could be reached.
Li1nits of belligerent rights.-"\Vhen Ger1nany issued on
February 4, 1915, the 'var zone procla1nation stating that
neutral vessels exposed the1nselves to danger in the 'vaters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland and in the
English Channel, the Unit~d States sent a note of protest. In this note of February 10~ 1915, it 'vas said:
"It is of course not neces~ary to remind tlle German Government that the sole right of a belligerent in dealing with neutral
vessels on the high seas is liinited to visit and search, unless a
blockade is proclaimed and effectively maintained, which this
Government does not understand to be proposed in this case. To
declare or exercise a right to attack and destroy any vessel entering a prescribed area of the high seas without first certainly determining its belligerent nationality and the contraband character
of its cargo \YOuld be an act so unprecedented in naval warfare
that this Govern1nent is reluctant to believe that the llnperial
Govennnent of Gennany in this case conten1plates it as possible.
The suspicion that ene1ny ships are using neutral flags improperly can create no just presumption that all ships traversing a
prescribed area are subject to the same suspidon. It is to determine exactly such questions that this Government understands
the right of visit and search to have been recognized." (Foreign
Helations, U. S., 1915, Supplement, p. 98.)

Foreign interpretation of nati01lal duties.-Belligerent
rjghts and duties as well as neutral rights and duties rest
upon international law. Belligerents have often atteinpted to extend their rights and· neutral duties even by
suggesting that neutrals take action in regard to opposing belligerents which might be beyond neutral obligations.
On January 30, 1917, the N or,vegian Govern1nent by a
Royal Ordinance prescribed that after February 6, 1917:
" Suumarines, equipped for use in war, and belonging to a belligerent power, may not be navigated or remain in Norwegian territorial waters. Breach of this prohibition will render such vessels liable to attack by armed force without previous warning.
" This prohibition shall not prevent submarines fron1 seeking
Norwegian territorial waters on account of stress of weather, or
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damage, or in order to save human life; when within territorial
waters in such cases the vessel shall be kept at the surface and
shall fly her national flag and also the international signal indicating the reason of her presence. As soon as the reasons justif~·ing the arrival of the vessel are no longer present, she shall
(1epart from territorial waters." (1917 Naval vVar College, International Law Documents, p. 195.)

The British and A1nerican Governn1ents had raised
question as to the 1neasures taken to enforce this ordinance. To the Government o£ the United States in reply
to a suggestion o£ a fe'v days previous that Norwegian
waters be mined against German submarines in addition
to the patrolling of the 'vaters, the Minister o£ Foreign
Affairs on August 20, 191'8, said:
"'Vith reference to the statement of the American Govenunent
that the Norwegian Government has not insisted on impartial
<"Ompliance with the Norwegian resolution in question, and that
the measures hitherto adopted have only been nominal, and in
Yiew of the recommendation of the American Government to the
Norwegian Government to take such new and effectiYe measures
n~ will effectually vrevent the vassage of German submarines
through Norwegian territorial waters, the Norwegian Government
uesires to point [out] the following:
"The duties imposed in time of war by international law on a
neutral state in respect of its territorial waters consist, partly
in the obligation that it shall prevent by all the means at its
disposal any of the belligerents utilizing them for operations of
war or as a base there for, and partly in the obligation that it
shall enforce upon all the belligerents equally the observance of
the regulations it issues. No matter what may flow from these
cbligations, none of the belligerents is justified by international
law in demanding that special measures be taken by the neutral
state in its own territorial waters. The Norwegian Govenunent
i~ conYinced that it has unquestionably fulfilled its obligations in
respect of both the above-mentioned points. Just as its efforts
since the commencement of the war· have been directed towards
the maintenance of an inviolable neutrality, so it is still its firm
intention to Inaintain it in the future and to avoid any step which
may be considered as a deviation from this attitude.
"The above-mentioned resolution of January 30, 1917, whirh
concerns the passage through and sojourn in territorial waters.
of submarines, is solely based on consideration of Norwegian interest and is obviously not intended to facilitate the war meas-
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ures of one or other of the belligerents. Neither does it enjoin
upon Norway any other obligation under international law than
that of enforcing the resolution equally upon all parties concerned
which the Norwegian Government, as already mentioned, is convinced that it has done. It cannot concede the right to any state
1 o demand special 1neasures in order to insure its observance.
"It will, however, be calculated to call forth the serious consideration of the Norwegian Government if it be established that
German submarines have utilized Norwegian territorial waters
ns a passage in violation of the said resolution. The Norwegian
Government must request the American Government for more
detailed information in regard to the cases which the latter has
in n1incl relative to the appearance of German submarines in Xorwegian territorial waters. The Norwegian Government would appreciate as con1plete information as possible, such as fuller details
:1~ to the time and place and the certainty that the submarines in
question were Gern1an in each case, besides information as to the
state of the weather.
"When the Norwegian Government receives the infonnation referred to from the American Government, it will immediately take
into cousideration [the measures] occasioned thereby in the interests of Norway and the Government might then feel called
upon to take n1easures for sharper protection of Norwegian territorial waters. But it must definitely insist that it is its incontestable right by international law to determine for itself what
measures should be taken in this respect." (Foreign Relations,
U. S., 1918, Supplement I, vol. II, p. 1779.)

Position of state D.-While the geographical contiguity of states X, Y, and D might give rise to certain
doubts as to the neutral obligations of state D, this contiguity would not affect the rights of X and Y under a
declaration of war.
The vessels of war of X or of Y might visit and search
the merchant vessels of state D or of any neutral state.
If a vessel of war of state Y should capture a merchant
Yessel of D or of a neutqtl state, the vessel of war might
find difficulty in bringing it to a prize court and other
problems might arise but it is possible that these might
not arise and it 'vould be for states Y and D to adjust
such difficulties aft€r they arise rather than for state D
to presume in advance to declare the rights of Y. It is
clear that state D could not legally deter1nine the bellig-
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erent rights of state X nor could state D lawfully refuse
to recognize these rights. The rights in regard to contraband, continuous voyage, unneutral service, and other
belligerent rights could not be denied to state X by
state D.
As a state not a party to the 'var, state D 'vould not be
at liberty to permit indefinite sojourn in its ports of vessels of war or to tolerate any act 'vithin its jurisdiction
'vhich would constitute a nonfulfillment of neutral duties.
~Ianifestly from its geographical position, state Y may
be under certain disadvantages when at war with a maritime state, but the laws of war and of neutrality are not
conditioned upon premises of a geographical nature
though one or the other of the belligerents may be more
strategically at an advantage on account of its location.
SOLUTION

(a) State A may lawfully in its proclamation of neutrality exclude all vessels of 'var and vessels assimilated
thereto. This would apply to armed merchant vessels,
but ordinarily not to unarmed merchant vessels whether
ur not decks had been strengthened.
(b) State B may lawfully refuse to admit vessels of
war of X and Y with prize except on account of unseaw·orthiness, stress of weather, or lack of fuel or supplies.
(c) State 0 may lawfully refuse to permit aircraft of
Y to fly. over its territory to a vessel of Y which is at sea.
(d) State D may not lawfully refuse to grant to X
and Y rights 'vhich might flow from a declaration of war
ur refuse to accept any neutral obligations so far as aerial
or maritime acts are concerned though the geographical
location of state D might make special regulations justifiable.

